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Are the ideologies and strategies of all Syrian militant-opposition 
groups fighting Assad forces similar to those of Islamic State group 
(ISIL)? 
It can be said that politicians tend to simplify the jihadi phenomena 
in Syria – and elsewhere – by adopting a security approach, but 
reality dictates that explaining the phenomena is not so clear cut. 
Several forms of jihadi can be identified. Global jihadists, such as 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIL), seek to establish a state with 
unlimited borders, while on the other side, local jihadists are limiting 
their actions to the confines of the recognised borders of Syria.  The 
approach adopted to deal with the latter category should not be the 
same: the approach should be political inclusiveness!
When the Assad regime used brutal military force to crush the 
peaceful protestors in 2011, it left the peaceful opposition no choice 
but to resort to armed force, or a militancy method, to change the 
regime. Resorting to such instruments was inevitable for Syrians 
needing to protect their families and neighborhoods from arrest and 
murder by Assad troops and thugs (shabieha). However, some Arab 
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youths joined the Syrian militants after the democratic 
path encountered significant setbacks in their countries, 
such as in Egypt, where the Generals put an end to the 
country’s democratic transition.
For effectiveness, the militancy method has been placed 
within the common contemporary frame of Jihad, even 
though not all revolutionaries initially adopted the Jihadi 
ideology. Many Syrian insurgents are local homegrowns, 
with no history of following the Jihadi path, or adopting 
the Jihad ideals that developed outside Syria. Hence, it 
was not long before a transformation in some militant 
groups’ ideology emerged, discarding global Jihad and 
declaring the Syrianisation of their ideology and actions. 
The obvious example is the Islamic Movement of the Free 
Men of the Levant Harakat Ahrar Al-sham Al-Islamiyya 
(commonly known as Ahrar Al- Sham).
Ahrar Al-Sham was formed in December 2011. It is 
considered to be one of the most important Islamic 
groups in Syria that has engaged with several rebel 
alliances fighting Assad forces, in particular the powerful 
Jaysh al-Fatah Army of Conquest. The backbone of Ahrar 
Al-Sham’s membership consists of Syrians, the majority 
of whom have no previous experience of militancy, along 
with Islamists and jihadists released from prison. Ahrar 
Al-Sham adopted revisions (muraja’at)2 in its ideology 
during the very early stages of its involvement in the Syrian 
battle arena. This provided fertile ground for the spread 
of a new localised and nationalised version of the Jihad 
ideology, which rejected any type of involvement from 
beyond Syrian borders. A significant shift occurred when 
the group’s President Hassan Aboud (or Abou Abdallah 
Alhamawy) signed the Revolutionary Honor Pact in 
May 2014, which limited the scope of group operations 
against the Assad regime, allied militias and ISIL to 
Syrian territory. Moreover, Aboud and other founders 
of the group, escalated their criticism towards Jihadist 
ideology to the point that the group’s Vice-President 
Mohamed Al-Shami (or Abu-Yazan Al-shami) made 
a public apology on 2 September 2014 for the group’s 
endorsement of the Salafi-Jihadist doctrine.  He promised 
a substantial change in the group’s ideology and actions. 
However, shortly afterwards Aboud and Al-Shami, with 
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the leaders and some of the group’s main founders were 
killed in a mysterious blast on 9 September 2014. 
After that dramatic incident, given the complex 
environment of civil war, the most optimistic analysts 
expected the group to dwindle, if not fade away. But, it 
seems that the shift from a globalised to a nationalised 
Jihadi ideology, and the institutionalisation of the group 
were neither an individual decision nor a tactical move 
adopted by the group’s founders. After their death, the 
continuity of a nationalised group ideology could be 
witnessed, which was reflected when the movement 
changed its main slogan in March 2015 from the 
Umma project (a religious slogan referring to entire 
Muslim communities in the world and used by global 
jihadi adherents) to the revolution of Sha’ab (referring 
to Syrian people). Therefore, the group has recruited 
fighters from Syrian youth (Shabab) with less attention 
to the recruitment of foreign fighters (Muhajireen) who 
represent a non-significant number and have neither 
organisational high-ranking positions nor influence in 
the ideological direction of the group.
Moreover, Ahrar al-Sham has developed a different 
Islamic discourse to distinguish itself from Jihadi 
groups. It identifies itself as a Mujahedeen movement 
rather than as Jihadeen Jihadists fighting to abolish an 
autocratic repressive regime. In the same vein, unlike the 
ISIL ideology and Jihadist militant orthodoxy of other 
groups, which widen the scale of blasphemy (takfir) to 
encompass any Muslim and any group, including other 
jihadi factions who do not follow their ideology, Ahrar 
al-Sham discourse neither vets Muslim beliefs based on 
religious grounds nor imposes religious mores on local 
people. This has been perceived positively by the Syrian 
population in the free territories as it has attracted a 
number of youth (shabab) to join one of its offices.3  The 
new discourse allows the group to maintain good relations 
with other rebels, whether they have a jihadi ideology or 
not, which in turn allows Ahrar Al-Sham to play a vital 
role as a mediator among insurgent groups that operate 
in the free territories of Syria.
The institutionalisation of the group, initiated by the 
previous leadership, has effectively continued at all levels 
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of the group whether political or militant. The group is 
operating through three main offices: a political office; 
relief and services offices; and the militant arm. The offices 
work with civilian organisations to strengthen civilian 
rule in the free territories through Local Governance 
Councils (LGC), which represent an alternative to the 
absent civilian government in areas that were freed from 
regime control and that are run by the people living in 
the area. The institutionalisation of the group has allowed 
it to operate effectively in the battle areas and to gain 
public satisfaction in the free territories, as well as to be 
involved effectively in the negotiation arena. Also, with 
the absence of a charismatic leadership, as was Aboud’s 
case, the centre of the group’s power has shifted smoothly 
from the presidency to the Shura council, which has in 
turn strengthened the group’s institutionalisation.
It seems that Ahrar al-Sham has set a model that 
encompasses: revisionist ideology countering manhaj 
Salafi-Jihadism, particularly global manhaj; an inclusive 
approach to dealing with other political groups and 
militias; and a strong institutional structure that does 
not exist in other groups. These components shape the 
character of Ahrar al-Sham. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find that other Syrian jihadi 
groups have attempted to adopt such a model. The 
pragmatic leadership of the al-Nusra Front has not only 
tried to adopt it, but to hijack it by assuming populist 
ideological sectarian discourse as a group defending 
the Sunni population in Syria. Consequently, al-Nusra’s 
actions to dissociate from the al-Qaeda group took a new 
name (the Levantine Conquest Front or Fateh al-Sham) 
which, after some months, integrated with other armed 
factions into a new entity, the organisation for the 
Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham Liberation of the Levant (HTA). 
However, the changes have remained superficial and 
have not yet reached the essence. This, due to Fateh’s self-
perception, has built on its acquisition of ‘the righteous 
manhaj’, which makes it superior to any Islamic group 
operating on the ground.  Such superiority gives Fateh an 
ethical justification to seek to control other groups and 
to confiscate their properties (weapons and offices), relief 
organisations’ money and impose its thoughts on the 
local population. In fact, Fatah al-Sham’s path towards 
its new entity to conduct real transformation in terms of 
manhaj, dealing with people in the free areas as well as 
other armed groups in both battle and political arenas, is 
arduous.
While it is obvious that, until now, the Fateh-al-
sham change has been a tactical strategy to avoid the 
international alliance forces in Syria targeting its members 
and offices, it is not the case that Ahrar Al-Sham is going 
through a constructive transformation. They know that 
such a constructive shift would come at a high cost. It is 
likely that the loss of loyalty among their members and 
sponsors will constitute the immediate main cost. Tracing 
the movement’s transformative process shows that Ahrar 
al-Sham is not a static but a dynamic movement, and that 
its thought-frame and actions are affected by interaction 
with local environment, i.e. popular incubators 
(al-hadinah al-sha’biyyah), the new reality on the ground, 
and in the regional and international atmosphere.
Against this backdrop, further steps can be made 
by European policy-makers. Not only can a door be 
unofficially kept open to Ahrar al-Sham, but Ahrar 
al-Sham can also be part of dialogue rounds and be 
officially recognised as a legitimate Syrian armed group 
that has its place in diplomatic and political processes of 
arrangements for the future of Syria. Such inclusiveness 
would first provide further incentive to encourage Ahrar 
al-Sham and other groups to continue the transformative 
process, and second, it would weaken the extremist groups’ 
discourse that underlines that western governments 
would not accept Islamic movements as part of a political 
game.4 Moreover, it is recommended that the EU seeks 
to convince the U.S. administration that it should not 
list Ahrar al-Sham as a terrorist group, because such an 
action would hamper the internal mechanisms towards 
enhancing the nationalisation of the group’s ideology and 
developing it into a political movement of tomorrow’s 
Syria.  
The views expressed in the brief are solely those of the 
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